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RECENT REVELATIONS REGARDING THE RESEARCH
by Woo Suk Hwang and his colleagues on
patient-specific embryonic stem cells created
by somatic cell nuclear transfer (“Editorial
retraction,” D. Kennedy, 20 Jan., p. 335) in
South Korea undermine the credibility of the
nascent, and fragile, stem cell field. These
unfortunate circumstances may embolden
opponents of embryonic stem cell research who
have argued against such research based on
moral objections and on mistrust of scientists to
monitor their own activities and ambition. 
Excesses in high-profile biomedical re-
search are regrettably not new. The history of
the gene therapy field provides one perspec-
tive. Soon after cloning of mammalian genes
first became possible, expectations were raised
that gene therapy might be used to treat serious
genetic disorders, such as hemoglobin dis-
eases, cystic fibrosis, and cancer among oth-
ers. After a flurry of initial clinical experi-
ments in gene therapy that led to unsubstanti-
ated claims or lack of objective findings, a
panel was convened by the NIH Director
Harold Varmus in 1995 to assess the state of
the field (1). This group described a field in
which research findings were oversold, expec-
tations were raised beyond what was reason-
able at the time, and scientific rigor was
relaxed in the enthusiasm to rush ahead. 
If gene therapy and stem cell fields have ele-
ments in common, what does recent history sug-
gest for the future? Since 1995, progress in gene
therapy has been episodic, yet clearly on a posi-
tive trajectory. In an elegant study reported in
2000, Fischer and his colleagues provided evi-
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dence for successful gene therapy of X-linked
combined immunodeficiency (2). Reconstitution
of the immune system was sustained. However, a
significant setback was encountered by 2003.
Several patients developed leukemia due to inser-
tion of the gene therapy vector in an oncogenic
locus, a complication that was anticipated as a
rare “side effect” but may be addressable with
improved vectors. Fortunately, chemotherapy
induced remission in these patients. So, while
there are potential serious adverse events associ-
ated with gene therapy, they need to be weighed
against the lethality of the original condition and
the capacity to manage the side effects of therapy.
Although progress in the clinical arena hasn’t
matched what was hoped for in the early 1990s,
conclusive evidence of efficacy and success has
emerged 10 years later. 
Except for the use of bone marrow trans-
plantation for the treatment of primary hemato-
logical conditions, the stem cell field (as related
to treatment of human disease) is in its infancy,
perhaps similar to the status of gene therapy
nearly 20 years ago. Although we may despair of
the recent events unfolding in South Korea, we
should take solace from the confidence that
strict adherence to scientific rigor and reason
will ultimately prevail and permit realization of
the potential of stem cells to ameliorate the suf-
fering of patients with life-threatening diseases. 
STUART H. ORKIN
Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Dana-Farber Cancer
Institute, Children’s Hospital Boston, Harvard Medical
School, 44 Binney Street, Boston, MA 02115, USA.
Reactions to the Hwang Scandal
IT CAME AS QUITE A SHOCK TO KOREAN ACADEMICS TO LEARN THAT
Woo Suk Hwang’s papers on patient-specific stem cells were fabri-
cated. Members of the Korean Society of Molecular and Cellular
Biology, the largest life science academic society in Korea, seriously
regret that such a fraud could occur. Since the ethical debate over
human ovum supply and somatic cell cloning began, our society
members have felt very uneasy and frustrated.
Indeed, we decided to establish a charter for scientific conduct
with a strong emphasis on the ethical implications of biological
research. The life science researcher’s charter has been unanimously
acknowledged by our members and was declared officially in
October 2005 at the annual congress. 
The main points of the charter are as follows. First, we have to consider the impact that
research may have upon humans, society, and the ecosystem before inititating that research.
Second, we have to ensure and respect the dignity of life within the research objectives, from
cells to living organisms. Third, we should not fabricate any experimental results and should be
righteous in the distribution of materials and results. Finally, we should be fair in acknowledging
authorship and intellectual property of research outcomes. 
As the president of the Korean Society of Molecular and Cellular Biology, I sincerely regret
that such a fraud occurred. A strong policy to prevent any further similar disgraceful incidents
will be established. I believe in the ethical sincerity and academic integrity of our scientists, as
suggested in the Charter of Ethics for Life Science Researchers, and that we will continue on in
our efforts toward bettering society and human life.
SANG CHUL PARK 
President of Korean Society of Molecular and Cellular Biology, Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, Seoul
National University Medical School, 28 Yon Gon Dong, Chong No Ku, Seoul 110-799, South Korea.
Chung Myung-Hee, head of the Seoul National University panel that investigated
Woo Suk Hwang’s work, announces the panel’s findings at a press conference on 10
January.
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2. M. Cavazzana-Calvo et al., Science 288, 669 (2000).
IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT SCIENCE SHOULD LEAD
the way in recounting exposure of the fraudu-
lent claims of W. S. Hwang et al. that they
developed 11 patient-specific cell lines by
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) (D.
Kennedy, “Editorial retraction,” Letters, 20
Jan., p. 335). 
The profoundly negative effect of this
episode is all the greater because of the way in
which the matter was handled from the outset.
When the 2005 paper was received in the
Science editorial office, it was regarded as a
showstopper, something that would make big
headlines, with important implications for the
treatment of a number of diseases. That much
was noted in the News of the Week article “…
And how the problems eluded peer reviewers
and editors” (J. Couzin, 6 Jan., p. 23), e.g.,
“[i]mmediately, the journal’s editors recognized
a submission of potentially explosive impor-
tance.” The paper was published in due course
and hailed in several quarters as important sci-
ence. But was its science in any way special?
Even if Hwang et al. had achieved what
they described, all they had done was to repeat
with human material what had been done with
several other species. At best, it had required
skill, persistence, and some technical twists,
but nowhere was there evidence of any signif-
icant contribution of cell or molecular biology
or of concept. Success with other species
made it relatively easy to fake, and one cannot
blame the journal’s referees for failing to rec-
ognize that. 
If the Science editorial staff had paid more
attention to the science and less to the sensa-
tion, and if others had not leapt onto the band-
wagon, the impact of this sorry affair might
have been much less.
T. JOHN MARTIN
St Vincent’s Institute of Medical Research, 9 Princes Street,
Fitzroy, Victoria 3065, Australia.
THE ROLE OF YOUNG KOREAN RESEARCHERS IN
the Hwang controversy (“How young Korean
researchers helped unearth a scandal,” S.
Chong and D. Normile, News of the Week,
6 Jan., p. 22) raises important aspects of
research misconduct that are long overdue for
international action.
It took the actions of an anonymous
whistleblower to unmask the deception and
dishonesty of Woo Suk Hwang. It is note-
worthy that the whistleblower chose to make
his allegations anonymously—even though he
was no longer working in the laboratory—and
to a TV program and not to the university
involved or to regulatory authorities. 
The central role of whistleblowers in the
Hwang scandal affirms the urgent need for (i)
whistleblowing of fraudulent activity to be
accepted and encouraged as a legitimate duty
that is integral to the responsible conduct of
research; (ii) institutional policies that pro-
tect the rights of all parties, especially junior
researchers, to due process and protection
from retribution, intimidation, and harass-
ment; and (iii) an international standard
of responsible research and definition of
research misconduct. 
L. STEPHEN KWOK
14 Bedford Street, Willoughby North, NSW 2068, Australia.
Questions About Forensic
Science
IN THEIR REVIEW “THE COMING PARADIGM SHIFT
in forensic identification science” (5 Aug.
2005, p. 892), M. J. Saks and J. J. Koehler con-
fuse the roles of adversaries in the criminal jus-
tice system with those of objective scientists.
The “assumption of discernible uniqueness”
may seem to be a tenet of forensic science;
however, it is not found anywhere in the litera-
ture. They claim that “Traditional forensic sci-
entists seek to link crime scene evidence to a
single person or object ‘to the exclusion of all
others in the world.’” Some analyses can never
obtain such resolution, and the practitioners of
those disciplines would not claim to be able to
do so. Those disciplines that do seek to individ-
ualize evidence do not adhere to their invented
proposition “when a pair of markings is not
observably different, criminalists conclude that
the marks were made by the same person or
object.” The references they cite [see their (7,
8)] for this proposition contain no such lan-
guage. Source attribution rarely, if ever, relies
on a single marking. 
We take exception with the implication
that “all” experts have a propensity to fabri-
cate and lie about evidentiary results. In fact,
all comparative forensic science fields have a
reasonably high frequency of exclusions. This
is in conflict with the notion of data manipu-
lation to achieve unique identification. There
is as much incentive in obtaining a true result
when it is an exclusion as there is in achieving
a match. Fudging a match has dire conse-
quences that the overwhelming majority of
forensic scientists well appreciate; the true
perpetrator is still free preying on innocent
victims and the forensic scientist risks having
a contrary (legitimate) scientific opinion pre-
sented in court.
Errors do occur in any endeavor involving
humans. However, Saks and Koehler do not
define the types of error that can occur and
describe which ones are of consequence and
which are not. Instead, they focus on diminish-
ing the weight of evidence based on a hypothet-
ical error rate that does not apply to the case at
hand. Saks and Koehler declare that “the practi-
cal value of any particular technology is limited
by the extent to which potentially important
errors arise” as if this potential necessarily
decreases the value of the evidence. A known
error rate is not a direct measure of the reliabil-
ity of the specific result(s) in question. The most
direct way to measure the truth of the purported
results is to have another expert conduct his/her
own review (1), as is advocated by the National
Research Council for DNA analyses (2). 
Saks and Koehler misstate many of the
false-positive error rates. For example, micro-
scopic hair comparison is estimated at 12%.
The Houck and Budowle (3) study contains no
data on false-positive errors. It is a comparative
study of the different resolving capacities of
the methods. 
When an error of consequence occurs, cor-
rective action is taken. Subsequently, the foren-
sic scientist is better educated and less likely to
err. The calculation of a current error rate
should take this into consideration. The error
should never be ignored, and if the defense
believes it useful, it should make use of such
information during a cross-examination. 
Saks and Koehler did not point to one
example of the foundations of the disciplines
being baseless; they merely focused on errors
having been committed by scientists. Forensic
science is evaluating itself and is improving its
practices (4). Enhancing the forensic disci-
plines should continue and must be advocated. 
ROCKNE HARMON1 AND BRUCE BUDOWLE2
1Alameda County (CA) District Attorney’s Office, Oakland,
CA 94607, USA. 2FBI Laboratory, Quantico, VA 22135, USA.
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IN THEIR REVIEW “THE COMING PARADIGM SHIFT
in forensic identification science” (5 Aug.
2005, p. 892), M. J. Saks and J. J. Koehler
assert that error rates in forensic science can be
calculated for comparisons performed by
human examiners, and that these error rates
can then be used to predict the probability that
Published by AAAS
3 FEBRUARY 2006 VOL 311 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org608
LETTERS
an error (false match) occurred and thus assess
the probative value of the identification for the
jury. In fact, the National Research Council
concluded that using error rates in such a pre-
dictive fashion (especially error rates gathered
from proficiency testing) is inappropriate (1). 
The likelihood of committing an error will
be dependent on the complexity of the task, the
examiner, and various conditions of the task. In
forensic casework, the conditions are varied
and we are human and fallible. Proper quality
control is imperative to reducing (but not elim-
inating) the chance of error.
The authors indicated that proficiency test
errors of fingerprint experts were “about 4 to
5%” false-positive errors on at least one finger-
print comparison. The manufacturer of these
proficiency tests did not report a 4 to 5% “false-
positive” error rate (erroneous matches), but
rather they reported that 4 to 5% of the answers
“differed from the manufacturer’s expected
results” (2), a critical distinction. If an exam-
iner reports “inconclusive” (perhaps they
lacked the training and experience to make the
match) or records an answer incorrectly (cleri-
cal error), this will be reported as “differing
from the manufacturer’s expected results.” This
is not a false match as the authors are reporting. 
Their fig. 1, which purports to show a dis-
turbingly high incidence of false testimony
and forensic testing errors, has not previously
been published in any peer-reviewed scientific
journal. There is no discussion of the data
sampling techniques, methods, or criteria that
support this graph. 
I have several questions regarding the
source of these data: Were the errors attributed
to faulty “forensic testing” from a handful of
scientists or many? Were these cases and testi-
monies reviewed by experts qualified to make
scientific determinations, or rather by lay peo-
ple, law students/professors, and Innocence
Project volunteers? Of the “forensic testing
errors,” were these true testing errors or do
they simply reflect the limitations of the tests
and technology of the era?
I would invite the authors to perform their
own research experiments, attend the identifi-
cation conferences, and become involved in
the community that is already performing the
research for which they are calling. They will
find a new generation of scientifically gifted
and objective scientists, skilled at what we do,
but interested in discovering new ways to
improve it.
GLENN LANGENBURG
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, 1430
Maryland Avenue East, St. Paul, MN 55106, USA. 
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I WAS DISMAYED TO FIND A VARIETY OF ERRORS
in the Review by M. J. Saks and J. J. Koehler on
forensic identification sciences (“The coming
paradigm shift in forensic identification sci-
ence,” 5 Aug. 2005, p. 892). Of chief concern is
a spurious fact offered by the authors regarding
a paper I co-authored with Bruce Budowle (1).
In that paper, we reviewed 170 cases in which
microscopical and mitochondrial DNA exami-
nations were conducted on hair samples in
casework. We found that out of 170 cases, 133
were sufficient for analysis; of these, in only 9
cases did the hairs have a similar microscopic
appearance but different mtDNA sequences
(6.7%). Nowhere in that paper do we state that
error rates “for microscopic hair comparisons
are about 12%” as Saks and Koehler quoted in
their article. Moreover, the results of our study,
although illuminating, cannot be used as an
error rate for all forensic microscopical hair
comparisons (2); the authors state this them-
selves, citing the National Research Council’s
publication (2), but then go on to do just that
for many forensic disciplines. 
MAX M. HOUCK
Director, Forensic Science Initiative, Research Office,
Manager, Forensic Research and Business Development,
College of Business and Economics, West Virginia
University, 886 Chestnut Ridge Road, Morgantown, WV
26506–6216, USA.
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IN THEIR REVIEW “THE COMING PARADIGM SHIFT
in forensic identification science” (5 Aug.
2005, p. 892), M. J. Saks and J. J. Koehler
claim that handwriting error rates on profi-
ciency tests for handwriting experts are
between 40% and 100%. What they fail to state
is that the tests they are quoting from were
given between 1975 and 1985. These initial
tests were themselves designed as “tests” to
create a fair gauge of proficiency that would
also accurately reflect a forensic document
examiner’s (FDE’s) casework. Even so, those
in the early 1980s did not recognize the range
of conclusions issued by FDEs. Qualified con-
clusions on the correct side of the opinion scale
were incorrectly deemed errors, creating what
appears to be a higher error rate. Saks has pre-
viously written that the Collaborative Testing
Services (CTS) advisory committee informed
him that proficiency tests were not suitable for
use in gathering data on a forensic discipline
(1). CTS tests given between 1990 and 2005
reveal that FDEs issued proper conclusions 95
to 100% of the time (error rates between 0 and
5%). The lower error rates are not due to CTS
“dumbing down” the tests, but due to tests that
more accurately reflect casework and the range
of conclusions issued by FDEs. The error rates
of the contemporary CTS tests are in agree-
ment with Moshe Kam’s proficiency testing
studies (2–5).
JAN SEAMAN KELLY
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Forensic
Laboratory, Suite 201 B, 5605 West Badara Avenue, Las
Vegas, NV 89118, USA.
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Response
THE ESSENTIAL MESSAGE OF OUR REVIEW WAS
that forensic individualization/identification
science is on course for a “paradigm shift” in
which its future will be more scientifically
grounded than its past. 
Harmon and Budowle take issue with the
simple point that traditional forensic science
assumes that markings produced by different
people and objects are observably different.
The notion of uniqueness is widespread in
forensic science writing, thinking, and prac-
tice. We added the qualifier “discernible” to
the uniqueness assumption to indicate that
criminalists do not refer to uniqueness in the
abstract or as a metaphysical property. They
mean that conclusions about object uniqueness
are attainable in practice [(1), p. 45 and p. 123]. 
Harmon and Budowle suggest that we
claimed that source attribution “relies on a sin-
gle marking.” We said no such thing, as is evi-
dent in the sentence they quote. Our point was
simply that when criminalists cannot distin-
guish between two markings—such as two fin-
gerprints—they assume the markings were
made by a single person or object. 
Harmon and Budowle misrepresent our
Review when they say we implied that “all”
forensic science experts have a propensity to lie.
As we clearly indicated, the word between those
quotation marks is that of Andre Moenssens, a
former forensic scientist and lifelong supporter
of the field. What we did say was that the orga-
nizational setting and culture in which many
forensic scientists work can create pressures of
the sort Moenssens describes. Recent reports of
widespread data fudging and fabrication in
forensic science provide additional reason for
concern [e.g., (2, 3)].
Letters to the Editor
Letters (~300 words) discuss material published 
in Science in the previous 6 months or issues of
general interest. They can be submitted through
the Web (www.submit2science.org) or by regular
mail (1200 New York Ave., NW, Washington, DC
20005, USA). Letters are not acknowledged upon
receipt, nor are authors generally consulted before
publication. Whether published in full or in part,
letters are subject to editing for clarity and space.
Published by AAAS
Harmon and Budowle, as well as Langen-
burg, believe that error rates are not relevant
for predicting the chance that an error will
occur in an individual case. We addressed this
belief in our Review (pp. 894–895) and else-
where (4). It is a fallacy to believe that base
rates should be disregarded in individual pre-
diction tasks because they are insufficiently
case-specific. From a Bayesian standpoint, the
probability of error in a particular case requires
an assessment of both the prior probability that
the error will occur and the individuating fea-
tures of the target case. Because the
error rate informs the prior proba-
bility (and will often be identical to
it), it is enormously relevant to an
estimate of the chance of error in a
particular case. This is one reason
why forensic scientists should par-
ticipate in well-designed profi-
ciency tests on a regular basis. As
reliable data from these tests accu-
mulate, it should be possible to
take advantage of increasingly
refined error rate estimates.
Harmon and Budowle assert
that we “did not point to one exam-
ple of the foundations of the disci-
plines being baseless [but] merely
focused on errors having been com-
mitted by scientists.” We did not say
that forensic science is “baseless.”
Instead, we identified a series of issues that go to
the heart of the status of the traditional forensic
sciences as mature sciences. For example, we
pointed to forensic individualization science’s
continued reliance on an unproven and likely
untestable 19th-century model of uniqueness.
We suggested that the field needs to adopt a
more realistic, data-based, and probabilistic
approach. We also noted the paucity of basic
research on assumptions and lack of applied
research on procedures. 
Langenburg takes issue with our report that
“[a]bout 4 to 5% of examiners committed
false-positive errors on at least one latent” in
fingerprint proficiency tests conducted during
the past decade. He says that 4 to 5% actually
represents the rate that answers differed from a
manufacturer’s expected results. Langenburg
is mistaken. Our 4 to 5% estimate is the pro-
portion of analysts who indicated that a latent
print matched a finger that it did not match at
least one time on the proficiency test. This esti-
mate does not include inconclusives. The pro-
portion of analysts who gave answers that dif-
fered from the manufacturer’s expected results
(i.e., the proportion of analysts who did not
correctly identify all latent prints in a test) is
much larger, about 25%. 
Consider the most recent of many latent
print proficiency tests that we relied upon in
the paper (5). In this test, 259 analysts were
provided with 11 latent prints plus known
prints from 4 relevant individuals (persons A to
D). Seven analysts (3%) committed obvious
false-positive errors. Of these, two analysts
mistakenly said that a print that belonged to
person A belonged to person B; three analysts
mistakenly said that prints that should have
been marked as unidentified belonged to per-
son C; and two analysts mistakenly matched
prints that belonged to persons A and B to peo-
ple who were not even provided on the test.
These are false-positive errors.
One cannot sweep away the mistakes that
have been committed by suggesting they are
mere clerical errors or the cautious “inconclu-
sives” of novice examiners. Proficiency tests
have detected, and continue to detect, signifi-
cant false-positive errors by latent print exam-
iners. The rate at which these and other errors
occur should be tracked, published, and studied
to help identify the probative value of reports
offered by forensic scientists.
Langenburg expresses concern about the
data on DNA exoneration cases that appear in
our fig. 1. As indicated in the Review, the
underlying data were provided to us by the
Innocence Project, and we relied on those data
when computing the proportions associated
with the factors in the figure. These data repre-
sent all of the DNA exoneration cases that have
been coded by the Innocence Project (n = 86
cases) to date. Dozens more cases remain
uncoded. Research on DNA exonerations is
obviously in its infancy, and we support calls
for a more complete and scientific review of
these cases.
Houck complains that the 12% error rate
we provided for microscopic hair comparisons
“using results of mitochondrial DNA testing as
the criterion” (p. 895) is not expressly stated in
the Houck and Budowle article we cited (6).
The data in the Houck and Budowle article
formed the basis of our computations, just as
they did for the new calculation that Houck
offers in his Letter. 
Table 2 in Houck and Budowle compares
the results of visual and mtDNA testing for 170
pairs of hairs (known and questioned). Each
mode of testing yielded four categories of out-
comes: association (the hairs match), exclu-
sion (the hairs don’t match), inconclusive,
and no exam (unsuitable sample for testing).
Omitting the 37 unsuitable pairs, 133 re-
mained. Houck now reports that “in only 9
cases did the hairs have a similar microscopic
appearance but different mtDNA sequences
(6.7%)” (sic: 9/133 ≈ 6.8%). Even if Houck
has sound reasons for deflating the error rate
by including 38 inconclusives in his denomina-
tor, why not also mention that dif-
ferent conclusions were reached
by the two methods 35% of the
time (46/133)?
Where ground truth is unavail-
able, as in Houck and Budowle’s
study, a conventional approach is
to select what is believed to be the
best measure as the criterion
(“gold standard”) against which a
measure of interest can be com-
pared. Taking such an approach,
how do microscopic hair compar-
isons stack up against the mtDNA
gold standard when conclusions
were offered by examiners? One
way to report such data is to say
that of the 26 cases in which the
mtDNA found an exclusion,
the examiners using the visual
approach called an association 9 times. These
data indicate a Type I false-positive error rate
of 35% (9/26). Another way to look at the data
is to report that 9 times out of the 78 times that
visual examiners declared an association
(12%), the mtDNA technique showed an
exclusion. That is the 12% we reported in our
Review. 
We did not state that handwriting error rates
on proficiency tests are between 40% and
100%, as Kelly claims. We said that the error
rate has run as high as 100%, and we should
have more clearly indicated that the risk of
error on subsequent proficiency tests still ran
as high as around 40%.
Kelly correctly notes that, in general, exam-
iners made fewer errors on more recent profi-
ciency tests than they made in the past. What
accounts for this performance change? A
thoughtful student of this matter has com-
mented: “Have handwriting examiners
improved abruptly and markedly? Or did the
tests become easier? Most likely, the latter. The
test manufacturers describe them as more
straightforward, they appear to be simpler, and
rather than complaining about test difficulty
(as examiners did before the 1990s), examiners
now commented about how easy the tests
were” [(7), p. 69]. 
The difficulty of the writing task could have
an enormous impact on examiners’ perform-
ance. For example, in one recent test where the
items varied in difficulty, examiners were pro-


























A forensic scientist at George Washington University studies DNA evidence.
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vided with several handwritten receipts and two
known sources (8). On one of the receipts, the
signature was that of one of the known sources,
but the text was produced by neither source. Of
131 examiners, 127 (97%) correctly concluded
that the signature “was” or “probably was” that
of one of the known sources. But only 25 exam-
iners (19%) correctly excluded both known
sources as persons who did not or probably did
not write the text of the receipt. 
These and other test data suggest that
examiner performance varies markedly with
the features of the writing task. We therefore
support systematic research aimed at mapping
the relationship between the varying attributes
of writing problems and the circumstances of
the examination, and how well examiners per-
form under those varying conditions. The
fruits of such research will provide exactly the
kind of information the Supreme Court says
trial courts need, namely, guidance for assess-
ing expert performance in the expert “task at
hand” (9, 10).
MICHAEL J. SAKS1 AND JONATHAN J. KOEHLER2
1College of Law, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287,
USA. 2McCombs School of Business, University of Texas,
Austin, TX 78712, USA. 
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CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS
News Focus: “After the crisis: more questions about prions” by M. Enserink (16 Dec. 2005, p. 1756). This article on
synthetic prions reported that the “protein-only” hypothesis is not clinched by the generation of prion infectivity in
Claudio Soto’s PMCA reaction. The major caveat was described as follows: “because the reaction takes place in a
complex, brain-derived chemical mix, one cannot rule out that, say, a small piece of nucleic acid that’s essential to
infectivity was replicated along with PrPSc in each cycle.” This concern was mistakenly attributed to Byron Caughey,
who agrees with Soto’s statement that nucleic acid replication under such cell-free conditions is highly unlikely. A
more plausible caveat, Caughey suggests, is that a small host-derived nucleic acid, sulfated glycosaminoglycan, or
other non-protein molecule might be provided as a component of infectivity in each amplification cycle with the
addition of normal brain homogenate.
TECHNICAL COMMENT ABSTRACT
Comment on “Neutral Ecological Theory Reveals Isolation and Rapid
Speciation in a Biodiversity Hot Spot”
Rampal S. Etienne, Andrew M. Latimer, John A. Silander Jr., Richard M. Cowling
Latimer et al. (Reports, 9 September 2005, p. 1722) used an approximate likelihood function to estimate parameters of
Hubbell’s neutral model of biodiversity. Reanalysis with the exact likelihood not only yields different estimates but also shows
that two similar likelihood maxima for very different parameter combinations can occur. This reveals a limitation of using
species abundance data to gain insight into speciation and dispersal.
Full text at www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/311/5761/610b
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